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Report

Multistakeholder Governance for DPI

A Compendium of Evidence and Value for Government Collaboration

Authors Co-Develop, Caribou

In partnership with

This report brings together evidence and practical examples to show how multistakeholder governance supports safe, inclusive, and trusted digital public infrastructure (DPI). Drawing on DPI deployments and lessons from adjacent fields, it demonstrates how collaboration among government, civil society, academia, the private sector, and other nongovernmental actors can strengthen trust, legitimacy, accountability, and adoption. Through real-world global examples, the report shows how multistakeholder governance can work in practice to enable DPI initiatives to deliver greater public value at scale.

This report is accompanied by A Practitioner’s Guide for Building Trust and Unlocking Adoption.

Contributors Dr. Emrys Schoemaker, Krisstina Rao, Thomas Kirk, Matthew McNaughton

Date

DOI 10.64329/BNXR3060-1

This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.

Multistakeholder Governance for DPI

1. Why multistakeholder governance matters now

1.1 Digital public infrastructure: Societal collaboration for societal scale

Digital public infrastructure is transforming societies through the provision of digital identity, payment, and data exchange systems. These represent the foundations upon which individuals and states can build new technologies, businesses, and services, and together they promise to accelerate economic development, support governments to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, and bring individuals and states into closer relationship.

The digital transformation of government is one of the biggest evolutions of public service delivery, and it is not going away. Digital public infrastructure (DPI) offers an approach for actors to exercise sovereignty and to proactively shape the arc of transformation rather than leaving it in the hands of others. The competing interests that seek to shape this transformation, and the extensive pollution of the digital soil in which this takes place, together make establishing trust all the more important in establishing a digital state that delivers for its people.

Governments are increasingly selecting DPI as their approach to driving societal-wide digital transformation, and those that get safeguards and governance right stand to unlock its full potential. There is growing recognition that DPI systems which actively involve constituents across society generate the legitimacy and trust that drive adoption, and that adoption is what converts public infrastructure into public value. For governments that have moved beyond the question of how to build and deploy these systems, multistakeholder collaboration (the active involvement of government, civil society, and the private sector in shaping and stewarding DPI initiatives) is the proven means by which they can secure that return on investment and ensure these systems deliver at scale.

As with historical infrastructure such as roads, electricity grids, and the internet, DPI initiatives are unfolding across a diversity of social, economic, and political contexts. Interest in the DPI approach has moved beyond early pioneers like India, Singapore, South Korea, Estonia, and Brazil and as of 2025, expanded to more than 100 countries (out of 210). The goals being pursued are ambitious and varied, from economic growth and the efficient allocation of public services to the realization of individual rights and opportunities. Governments that draw on the knowledge, networks, and legitimacy of a broad coalition of partners are better positioned to achieve these goals faster and more durably than those acting alone.

DPI as a large-scale infrastructure initiative is not only a technical challenge. It disrupts the status quo and creates opportunities for some while closing them for others. It is also an approach that connects across government, and across diverse stakeholders. This is precisely why multistakeholder governance is a strategic asset, not an administrative burden. Shared conceptual frameworks and goals, and effective governance institutions built with input from across society, are what enable DPI to earn widespread trust, adapt to new challenges, attract continued investment, and maintain accountability when things go wrong.

The question for government practitioners is therefore not whether to engage partners, but how to do so strategically: which partners to bring in, at which stages, and through what structures. This is not a concession of control; it is how governments amplify their own impact. Governments are uniquely positioned to lead this effort, and in different contexts, different government actors may be the most well positioned. For example, it may be political figures, bureaucrats, regulators, judiciary, or auditors who are best placed to lead efforts to advance multistakeholder collaboration. They hold the authority to convene, the mandate to act in the public interest, and the ability to set the terms on which partners engage. Where there is political will and institutional willingness, multistakeholder collaboration offers access to the full range of knowledge, capacities, reach, and legitimacy that no single actor, public or private, can provide alone.

Box 1: DPI’s promises and pitfalls

In 2023, the G20’s T20 taskforce issued a report arguing that “a key principle is often missed—of DPIs to be accountable towards the public, not just in their impact but also their conceptualisation and design.” 1 The suggestion is that when DPI initiatives are designed and operated without substantive multistakeholder debate about their purposes and governance, the promises they hold are threatened and the risk of potential pitfalls increases.

This is well illustrated by DPI initiatives in India, Jamaica, and Kenya. Some of these have been praised for enabling end users to access formal banking systems and products, increasing the efficiency of state services, enabling greater tax collection, and fostering innovation and competition across a variety of sectors. Yet at the same time, research has also documented a host of avoidable problems:

  • In India, digital identity initiative Aadhaar unintentionally prevented rural and marginalized groups from accessing vital welfare and led to newly onboarded, yet digitally and financially illiterate, citizens falling prey to emergent forms of financial predation. 2
  • In Kenya, an initially narrow legislative approach to its foundational ID system led to it being labeled as “purpose-free” by commentators frustrated with the vague articulation of its aims. The High Court forced the government to enact an “appropriate and comprehensive regulatory framework” before rollout. 3
  • In Jamaica, donor pressure resulted in an ID system that failed to address diverse societal needs or build the broad buy-in necessary for widespread public trust, ultimately delaying implementation for years. 4

Taken together, these cases point toward a shared structural gap: the absence of meaningful multistakeholder governance at the moments when it matters most. Where purposes are set without broad deliberation, where design choices are made without input from those most affected, and where accountability mechanisms remain weak or poorly articulated, even technically sophisticated DPI initiatives have struggled to deliver on their potential. The evidence suggests that multistakeholder governance is not an optional addition to good DPI design but an enabling condition for it, shaping whether systems earn the legitimacy, trust, and adaptive capacity they need to function well over time.

Key takeaways

  • A common thread across each initiative was the absence or shallowness of multistakeholder governance processes in goal setting and operations. The remedy, it is increasingly recognized, is for governments to provide opportunities for a diversity of voices to shape, co-govern, and innovate upon DPI.
  • Prioritizing inclusion is a critical opportunity to deepen DPI adoption. Failing to do so is a lost opportunity to build trust, adoption, and impact.

1.2. Why a multistakeholder governance guide for DPI?

The problem

DPI inherits many of the governance challenges associated with digital transformation more broadly, but the speed and scale at which it is being adopted by governments makes the stakes particularly critical and the need for targeted guidance urgent. With infrastructural projects such as DPI initiatives, trust among diverse stakeholders (government, private sector, and civil society) has a key role to play in determining success. yet there are many instances of poor adoption: digital identity systems being rolled out, but few users picking up their cards and fewer still using ID-enabled services. Data exchange systems are operational in theory, but hard copies of documents are still expected and presented. The absence or erosion of trust not only puts public investments at risk, but also brings the operator’s (and in turn, the government’s) legitimacy in question.

Yet building trust is hard, a quality of perception and relationship as much as a technical aspect. There is limited guidance on what it takes to build trust, and a lack of clear, practical guidance to support governments in their efforts to establish and maintain trust in DPI systems. This is partly because societal-scale approaches to digitalization are relatively new, and partly because the literature is more focused on the impressive outcomes DPI can enable than on how inclusive governance processes actually work. Despite broad consensus on the importance of inclusive and accountable governance, reflected in calls from the G20, UnDP, and others, there are few DPI-focused guides for those seeking to put these commitments into practice.

The gap in guidance is compounded by the varied and often difficult conditions in which DPI initiatives operate. State capacity differs enormously across implementing countries. not every government has the institutional infrastructure, technical expertise, or dedicated resources needed to design and sustain complex governance processes, especially multistakeholder ones. Sociopolitical context presents its own constraints. In countries with high levels of institutional distrust or corruption, broad engagement processes can be difficult to design credibly and risk being captured by powerful interests. In countries deploying digital identity systems or other initiatives that depend on achieving mass enrollment, the window of political opportunity is often narrow, and decisions about governance architecture may need to be made quickly, with limited time for extended consultation.

This guide is designed with these realities in mind. rather than offering a single blueprint, it draws on evidence from adjacent fields to identify what has worked across a range of contexts, and why, so that practitioners can adapt its guidance to their own circumstances. It is also designed to complement and support other initiatives, such as the DPI Safeguards Initiative and OGP national action plans.

The normative case

The case for multistakeholder governance is well grounded in both principle and evidence. In 2023, G20 leaders called for the creation of DPI initiatives that are “safe, secure, trusted, accountable, and inclusive.” 5 A 2025 World Bank white paper argued that DPI initiatives should center principles of “equity, trust, and value.” 6 The shared goal across these frameworks is to design DPI initiatives that build and maintain public trust through inclusive governance.

The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework gives this principle its clearest formulation:

“No single group of responsible authorities can enable, maintain or sustain DPI; its systems are only effective, safe and inclusive if the ecosystem is utilized with a whole-of-society approach.” 7

This encourages initiatives to engage communities and to provide avenues for remedy and redress when things go wrong. It emphasizes the need to include groups that are traditionally overlooked, discriminated against, or marginalized. To formalize this, it calls for “the establishment of a robust legal, regulatory and institutional framework that should promote transparent and participatory multistakeholder governance.” 8

Building on this, the recent DPI Roadmap Playbook advises that all stakeholders “who likely can affect or who are affected by the outcomes” of DPI initiatives should be included in participatory processes. 9 It recommends contextually specific combinations of formal and informal processes for consultation, discussion, and co-creation throughout the digitalization life cycle, in order to shift “the nature of who engages in and shapes digital policy issues” (see Box 2). The shared idea is that a diversity of stakeholders can help DPI initiatives to be appropriate for, and to iteratively adapt to, the complex challenges they face, and that governments have the critical task of creating the processes, relationships, and institutions through which that engagement can occur.

The pragmatic case

The utilitarian case is equally well established. research on traditional digitalization efforts shows the consequences of getting governance wrong: ad-hoc and poorly coordinated collaboration between state representatives, donor organizations, and private actors led to inefficiencies, duplications, high costs, and vendor lock-ins. Together, these factors can result in substantial investments that fail to deliver and may have to be repeated. Tokenistic consultations with, and a lack of ongoing involvement of, the intended users of digital infrastructure resulted in low adoption rates, limited innovation, and prevented the exchange of information needed to address problems as they emerged.

In contrast, multistakeholder processes that include a diversity of voices, that give participants meaningful influence, and that create ongoing mechanisms for feedback and adaptation produce DPI initiatives that are better designed, more resilient, and more widely used. Inclusion, in this sense, is not only a normative commitment, but one of the primary determinants of whether DPI achieves societal value. More than a “nice to have,” inclusion is the social infrastructure that serves as the foundation for successful, high-impact DPI to deliver value at scale.

Who is this guide for?

This guide is written primarily for government officials and policymakers responsible for designing, implementing, or overseeing DPI initiatives. It is intended to make the case to decision-makers to support engagement with civil society, industry, and the private sector, and as a starting point for creating follow-on resources. It is intended to be practical: a resource that can be drawn on at different points in a DPI initiative’s life cycle, depending on the specific governance challenges a government is facing. It complements the separate practitioner’s guide. 10 These two guides provide resources to support overcoming challenges might include how to structure an initial stakeholder engagement process during conception and scoping; how to design participation mechanisms that go beyond tokenism during strategy and design; how to build feedback loops that support adaptation during development; or how to maintain accountability and public trust during ongoing operations.

It will also be of use to civil society organizations, development partners, technical implementers, and funders who support DPI initiatives, particularly those looking to actively shape how digital systems are designed and deployed, alongside governments.

The guide does not assume a single model of government capacity or a single political context. Its core ambition is to surface principles and practices that can be adapted across a range of circumstances, drawing on the experience of fields that have grappled with similar governance challenges.

1.3. How to use this guide

This guide is organized around two frameworks. Together, they provide a structure that practitioners can navigate according to their specific context and the challenges they are facing.

  1. The DPI life cycle, which grounds the guidance in the practical stages through which DPI initiatives develop (stages which are common to most digitalization initiatives)
  2. The Common Good principles, which are articulated in terms of the outcomes associated with each principle and which set out the normative principles guiding multistakeholder governance of DPI

The guide draws on a review of literature from adjacent fields, combined with interviews with practitioners experienced in DPI governance. The evidence and insights from this research are presented in section 2. The accompanying brief, A Practitioner’s Guide for Building Trust and Unlocking Adoption, translates these into actionable guidance, including checklists and guiding questions for practitioners. Each substantive section is anchored with an illustrative case study and draws on examples from across the case study base.

It’s important to emphasize that these frameworks and the structuring of guidance around them are offered as suggestions, not rigid prescription. Much of the guidance may have utility across different elements of the framework. Users know best their own contexts, programs, and needs, and are best placed to when to apply which insights and guidance. In addition, the digitalization life cycle is an ongoing, cyclical process, not a singular process with a start and end. That means that many of these processes are ongoing, and so multistakeholder collaboration should be approached as an ongoing part of a broader approach, not simply a singular process of engagement and participation.

Box 2: Digitalization life cycle

Digitalization programs share common stages. The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework suggests that DPI has five distinct life-cycle stages. 11 Each stage is associated with different functions, opportunities, and risks. The cycle is iterative, meaning that its stages can and should be returned to as the DPI initiatives evolve, new technologies and functions are added, unforeseen innovations and goals arise, and more information on what works and what doesn’t is collected.

  1. The Conception and Scoping stage focuses on the purpose, goals, constraints, and boundaries of a DPI initiative.
  2. In Strategy and design stage, the plans for DPI are socialized among responsible authorities and other stakeholders, impact metrics are identified, and potential barriers to implementation are addressed.
  3. In the Development stage, a prototype DPI is built according to defined specifications, ensuring functionality, reliability, and scalability. Here, the focus is on testing and iterating prototypes and on identifying additional risks.
  4. During the Deployment stage, the DPI is rolled out, operations begin, and a monitoring and redress system is put in place.
  5. Regular Operations and Maintenance then commences, with the focus on monitoring the DPI initiative’s function and use, and learning to support continued improvements and adaptations.

The digitalization life cycle

Digitalization programs, including DPI initiatives, commonly pass through a series of distinct phases: Conception and Scoping, Strategy and Design, Development, Deployment, and Operations and Maintenance. Each stage presents different governance challenges and opportunities. The guidance in this document is organized according to these life-cycle stages, helping practitioners identify the most relevant insights for where they currently are in an initiative’s development. This organizing scheme is a suggestion that users can adapt and deploy to best meet the needs and circumstances of their own contexts.

Box 2 shows where the Common Good Framework’s principles are most relevant to each life-cycle stage. readers can use this figure to navigate directly to the sections most pertinent to their situation.

The Common Good principles

Public policy thinkers have recently developed the Common Good Framework, structured around five interconnected principles. 12 The framework supports a shift from DPI that is built, owned, and provided “in the public interest” by a small set of actors, to DPI that is co-created, operated, and governed through genuinely multistakeholder processes, enabling the trust and inclusion that drive widespread adoption and use.

The Common Good principles can each support particular outcomes:

  • Achieving buy-in and trust through collective goals.These outcomes can be supported through the Common Good principles of purpose and directionality by, for example: setting an ambitious direction towards which policies may be designed, public-private partnerships formed, and citizens engaged.
  • Meaningful engagement.This can be achieved through the Common Good principle of co-creation and participation, including defining the rules and mechanisms for co-investment collaboration and coordination involving a diverse group of societal actors.
  • Adaptive capacity. This outcome can be supported through the Common Good principle of collective learning and knowledge governance, such as rethinking institutional practices that support collective learning and build long-term capabilities and capacities.
  • Maintaining trust. This outcome can be achieved through the Common Good principle of access for all and reward-sharing, such as ensuring that greater inclusion leads to the equitable distribution of public value to strengthen legitimacy and trust.
  • Transparency and accountability.The Common Good principle of accountability can contribute to the winning and retaining citizens’ trust by, for example, tracking progress through practices that demonstrate commitment to transparency and accountability.

This paper, and the guide to action that accompanies it, integrate the digitalization life cycle and the Common Good Principles. The life cycle is a descriptive lens reflecting a digital transformation cycle, while the principles are an explicitly normative lens and should be adopted if these are intended goals. The integration of the digitalization life cycle, which describes specific stages, and the principles, which link activities to the outcomes, provides an organizing frame for practitioners to draw on the perspectives, values, and strengths of a diversity of state, civil-society, and private-sector stakeholders. This approach challenges the assumption that the public or private sectors alone can deliver these systems by following established best practice. In its place, it positions entrepreneurial governments as the enablers of multistakeholder governance models that are adapted to specific social, economic, and political realities.

The ambition of multistakeholder governance for the common good is currently hindered by a scarcity of clear guidance for governments engaging in ambitious DPI projects. This is partly because societal scale approaches to digitalization are relatively new, and partly because the literature is focused on the impressive outcomes they enable rather than how they work.
Nonetheless, related and adjacent fields have long held multistakeholder governance to be vital to the success of complex initiatives with transformational potential. Throughout the guide, insights are grounded in evidence from these fields, which share with DPI the challenge of coordinating diverse actors around complex, politically contested initiatives with far-reaching societal consequences:

  • Open government and open data initiatives provide detailed evidence of how governments can structure meaningful participation across a wide range of political and institutional contexts.
  • Development projects that use “adaptive management” and “adaptive governance” approaches offer models for building iterative learning and community feedback into large-scale initiatives.
  • The extractive industries’ pursuit of a “social license to operate” illustrates how transparency, accountability, and community engagement shape public acceptance of contested projects.
  • Large-scale public-private partnerships surface lessons on balancing private sector capability with public accountability and equitable access.

2. What can multistakeholder governance achieve?

2.1. Achieving buy-in and trust: Set collective goals

The opportunity

The Conception and Scoping stage of the DPI initiative life cycle is an opportunity to collectively agree ambitious societal goals, which can help lay the foundations for trust and successful adoption of DPI systems and services.

For governments, the objective is to secure broad buy-in and trust for DPI initiatives. Clear and collectively agreed societal goals can connect DPI initiatives to the needs, values, and aspirations of wider society. This will encourage adoption by users and for follow-on innovation by stakeholders beyond those directly building and operating the DPI system. It will also provide the foundations for regulations to guide initiatives’ development and with which stakeholders can hold those governing them to account.

Substantive multistakeholder goal-setting processes should include a diversity of stakeholders representing the interests and needs of the wider public. It’s also important that the agreed goals are made explicit so that other stakeholders are clear about the functions and direction of transformational DPI initiatives. However, societal goals should be revisited as the new innovations or challenges emerge.

The challenge

Governments face a genuine pull in the opposite direction at the goal-setting stage. As the primary funders and often the primary architects of DPI initiatives, they are under pressure—from donors, technology providers, and their own institutions—to move quickly and to arrive at the table with preferred solutions already formed. The temptation to treat consultation as a ratification of decisions already made is real, and the consequences tend to surface later: in systems that fail to attract adoption, in trust that must be rebuilt at considerably greater cost, and in regulatory frameworks that reflect narrow rather than broad societal interests.

A second challenge is representational. Broad consultations that do not actively reach out to traditionally marginalized groups will reproduce the exclusions they were intended to address. Securing genuinely diverse participation at the goal-setting stage requires more than an open door.

Overcoming both challenges requires governments to trade speed for intentional deliberation, and to invest proactively in bringing in those whose absence would otherwise go unnoticed.

Box 3. Meaningful participation in multistakeholder governance

The International Association for Public Participation’s participation spectrum can be used as a guide to the levels of meaningful engagement in multistakeholder governance processes. 13 Meaningful multistakeholder governance can take many forms. As primary “owners” and implementers of DPI systems, governments need to decide what form of collaboration is appropriate. There are degrees of collaboration and power-sharing between “inform” and “empower” that may be necessary to allow for the contextual realities, needs and capacities of particular contexts, stakeholders, and governments.

INFORM CONSULT INVOLVE COLLABORATE EMPOWER
Public participation goal To provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problems, alternatives, and/or solutions. To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives, and/or decisions. To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered. To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision, including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution. To place final decision-making in the hands of the public.
Promise to the public We will keep you informed. We will keep you informed, listen and acknowledge concerns and aspirations, and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision. We will work with you to ensure that your concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision. We will look to you for advice and innovation in formulating solutions and incorporate your advice and recommendations into the decisions to the maximum extent possible. We will implement what you decide.

What works

Multistakeholder processes have been used in other fields to build trust and support programmatic implementation. For example, evidence for how multistakeholder processes can be orchestrated can be found in research on international development projects. It suggests that governments should initially focus on the collective identification of problems DPI initiatives will address. Doing so allows stakeholders to arrive at shared societal goals that include their value systems and are politically feasible.

Termed Problem-Driven Adaptive Iteration (PDIA), this approach to goal setting was developed from research on the low success rates of large World Bank–funded institutional reform initiatives. 14 It found that when recipient institutions began with their preferred models, they would often adopt the recommended visible trappings while ignoring the deeper values needed to ensure change. This occurred because imported solutions sidestep the building of supportive coalitions, ignore informal and cultural rules of the game, and rarely fit local political realities.

Further research shows that when governments begin by convening diverse coalitions of stakeholders to iteratively discuss problems to address, success is more likely. An initial focus on problems rather than solutions is key for surfacing issues and underlying causes that were hidden, thought to be too difficult to address or unconnected to initiatives’ aims. 15 Inclusive early dialogues also increase stakeholder investment in the outcomes of proposed solutions, often enabling champions to emerge and drive them forward.

Research also warns that collaboration has to be oriented towards success, or else it can lead to wasted time and resources, drain participants’ motivation and cause conflicts. 16 In practice, avoiding this means including knowledgeable and well-connected stakeholders, sometimes termed “authorizing agents,” in multistakeholder processes. 17 They often know what is politically feasible, can leverage their influence, and can hold coalitions together through disagreements. In many contexts they include informal powerholders, such as traditional leaders and business elites, that can provide unique perspectives and who may later become spoilers if ignored early (see Box 4).

Box 4. Pix’s approach to goal setting

Brazil’s Pix Forum, the multistakeholder governance mechanism for the Central Bank’s real-time payment system Pix, has been held up as an example of a governance body able to set ambitious societal goals and facilitate the kind of ongoing deliberation needed to hold a DPI initiative accountable to them. The goals the Pix Forum helped articulate and pursue were specific and consequential: zero transaction costs for citizens, parity of access between smaller and larger banks, and a broader mandate to increase financial inclusion by making digital payments cheaper and more accessible to all. This collectively agreed “directionality” gave Pix legitimacy among key constituencies inside and outside the state, and the story of how it was arrived at illustrates the value of building broad stakeholder investment in a DPI’s purpose from the outset.

The process began not with a DPI but with a market failure. The Central Bank initially sought to signal to the market that it wished to see interoperable solutions for the payments ecosystem. When the market failed to deliver, the Central Bank established an internal working group tasked with identifying cheaper and more accessible payment solutions. The group was composed of people with diverse backgrounds, including from the private sector and people with experience of agile programming approaches. Through wide-ranging discussion and exploration of international approaches, they arrived at the broad outline of what would eventually become Pix. Crucially, the group also began engaging stakeholders in the wider payments ecosystem during this formative period, including private-sector payment providers who were initially hesitant about a nationally owned payment switch but remained involved in discussions about the initiative’s goals.

When Pix launched, the working group formalized under the banner of the Pix Forum, by then incorporating representatives from a wide range of societal groups: credit card operators, banks, fintechs, civil society organizations including the church, and small business associations. Those familiar with the Forum’s early days described it as a place for “exchanging ideas and exchanging needs” and for “listening to the market,” set against a post-dictatorship enthusiasm for participation in governance. At the same time, participants stressed the important orchestrating role played by the Central Bank as the ultimate decision-maker. Mandated to regulate payments, the Bank was able to convene the diversity of stakeholders needed to ensure the Forum’s early success and to overcome larger private banks’ initial resistance to change.

Over time, the Forum evolved from a consultative body into a space for co-creating Pix’s policy responses to emerging challenges, with civil society organizations playing a tangible role in shaping the initiative’s strategic direction. Civil society participants were able to influence the goals described above, even as they noted a desire for more structured pathways between their contributions and formal decision-making. Hard-won credibility, new relationships, and trust among members, and between members and the Bank, were central to the Forum’s capacity to set and hold these goals over time.

The Pix Forum currently includes over 130 members and four thematic working groups covering business, technical, messaging, and security dimensions. Each engages stakeholders beyond the Forum and regularly provides input on new ideas and innovations, sustaining the goal-setting function through ongoing deliberation rather than treating it as a one-time exercise.

Key takeaways

  • Set goals through sustained deliberation. The Pix Forum’s most significant contribution was establishing a shared and legitimate vision for Pix’s purpose, including zero transaction costs for citizens and equitable access across the banking sector. These goals were not set unilaterally but arrived at through iterative engagement across a diverse stakeholder base, giving them durability and broad legitimacy.
  • Enabling conditions matter. The Central Bank’s convening authority, regulatory mandate, and willingness to orchestrate rather than simply consult were critical to the Forum’s effectiveness, particularly in the early stages when larger private sector actors were reluctant participants.
  • Co-creation and goal setting reinforce each other. The Forum’s working groups, which continue to address specific technical and policy challenges, sustain the broader goal-setting function by keeping stakeholders invested in Pix’s evolving direction. However, civil society organizations have indicated a desire for more structured links between participation and decision-making, a gap worth attending to in similar initiatives.

2.2. Meaningful engagements

The opportunity

The Strategy Design and Development stages of the DPI initiative life cycle can be energized through meaningful engagements with empowered stakeholders. Governments have the resources and legitimacy to shape multistakeholder governance arrangements and the regulations, such as around grievance redress and access to information, that underpin them. How they are orchestrated, the terms on which stakeholders participate, and how decisions are made will determine the potential for co-creation that draws upon the strengths of those involved. Done well, multistakeholder processes can become the engine rooms of DPI initiatives, able to build trust, incubate leaders, and new innovations.

However, DPI initiatives are rarely static, with new stakeholders and opportunities emerging over their life cycles. Multistakeholder processes should be treated as intertwined with DPI development rather than an instance of bringing in feedback from other stakeholders. This will mean that engagement is continuous and default, rather than being single instance efforts. Accordingly, the design of multistakeholder processes and regulations should be periodically revisited to ensure they remain fit for purpose, an approach that benefits from the adaptive capacity outlined in section 2.3.

The challenge

Multistakeholder governance processes are not insulated from the inequalities that structure wider society. Economic barriers to participation (e.g., travel costs, lost working time, the prior knowledge needed to engage meaningfully with complex technical proposals) can be significant and are often most acute in exactly the contexts where DPI promises the greatest transformative impact.

Power imbalances present a related but distinct challenge. The large investments and organizational capacities required for DPI initiatives tend to favor government and private sector participants. Civil society, by contrast, is often fragmented, under-resourced, and unfamiliar with the specific technical and regulatory terrain of DPI. Deliberate design to counteract these asymmetries is needed to ensure that multistakeholder processes don’t replicate the dynamics they are meant to correct.

Addressing these challenges requires dedicated leadership, authority, and resourcing, alongside forum design and support for stakeholders to participate, requirements that governments are uniquely placed to make, but that require sustained commitment rather than one-off effort.

What works

Countries participating in the Open Government Partnership (OGP) have demonstrated how governments can proactively shape meaningful participation in multistakeholder governance processes. Launched in 2011, the OGP supports stakeholders to design innovations that leverage digital technologies to make states more open, responsive, and accountable.

Research from the OGP suggests that governments are best placed to provide the resources to enable stakeholders to participate by covering costs such as travel and missed livelihoods. 18 They can also use a variety of contextual appropriate and well-publicized opportunities to increase access. They range from setting up regional or vertically linked multistakeholder forums at different levels of governance (e.g., local, provincial and national), to using online and hybrid meetings, and digital platforms that enable stakeholders to comment upon drafts of emerging plans and to receive replies.

Governments can also provide participating stakeholders with the necessary information to follow and contribute to deliberations. At its simplest, this can mean putting information on plans in easily accessible places, and in widely understood formats and local languages. This includes avoiding gatekeeping through the use of overtly technical information. Elsewhere, it may also mean increasing stakeholders’ specialist knowledge of the issues under consideration through public debates, deliberative polling, and expert advisory panels (see Box 5).

Box 5: Policy options

Public meetings create transparent forums where governments present proposals to communities and stakeholders before decisions are made. This could help to ensure that communities and their representatives in initiatives understand what DPI may mean for their lives before decisions are made and implementation begins. The method requires making the debates accessible on widely used platforms (e.g., radio, TV, online, etc.), explaining technical information via neutral experts, and moderating the debates.

Deliberative Polling® could help DPI initiatives understand what informed public opinion looks like on complex technology choices. 19 The method randomly selects citizens, provides them with balanced briefing materials on issues like digital identity or payment systems, facilitates small group discussions with trained moderators, and allows participants to question expert panels. Participants complete surveys before and after deliberation, revealing how opinions shift with increased knowledge.

Deliberative polling could reveal whether citizens support particular approaches once they understand the trade-offs. By compensating participants and ensuring demographic representativeness, the method can include voices from marginalized groups who might otherwise be excluded from technical discussions. The polling results could guide multistakeholder forums’ decisions and help secure wider buy-in for DPI roadmaps. This supports the Common Good Framework’s emphasis on co-creation by ensuring citizen voices shape directionality based on informed judgements.

Expert advisory panels could provide stakeholders in DPI governance processes with independent technical guidance. This may focus on the technical feasibility of innovations and safeguards, and help stakeholders to interpret evidence about potential risks and benefits. Panels could also support transparency by producing publicly available reports that explain technical issues in accessible language to wider audiences, helping to build the literacy needed for meaningful participation throughout other stages of DPI initiatives’ life cycles.

To consolidate trust, all three methods require complementary approaches: public debates need follow-up mechanisms showing how input influenced decisions; deliberative polls need connection to actual decision-making; and expert panels need clear mandates preventing blame-shifting while ensuring their advice serves inclusive stakeholder processes. Overall, the aim should be to ensure the methods do not substitute for meaningful democratic deliberation and equitable decision-making.

The OGP Multistakeholder Forum could help governments convene with civil society to develop, implement, and monitor national open government reform commitments. It convenes representatives from government, civil society, the private sector, and academia to co-design commitments and hold one another accountable. Because OGP membership requires governments to establish these forums as a formal condition of participation, this engagement is embedded in the architecture of the reform process itself.

For governments seeking to build public trust in DPI, OGP Multistakeholder Forums offer a credible channel for demonstrating accountability and openness. By bringing civil society into ongoing dialogue about the design and oversight of DPI, supported by independent reporting and public monitoring of commitments, governments signal that these systems are being developed in partnership rather than imposed unilaterally. 20

To orient stakeholders and address power inequalities, OGP multistakeholder processes focus on producing national action plans. 21 These plans outline specific commitments to advance transparency, accountability, and citizen participation over a two-year implementation period. They typically contain multiple commitments organized around themes related to OGP’s values and pre-agreed societal goals.

The decision-making process for national action plans varies, ranging from advisory to joint decision-making models. 22 At minimum, they must include joint chairing arrangements between government and civil society, and meet at least every six months. Government representatives are required to discuss their priorities and the political feasibility of different proposals. Once action plans are drafted, stakeholders must also review the final selection together while clearly stating their reasoning.

The OGP’s guidelines for its multistakeholder processes encourage mechanisms that place them in the “collaborate” and “empower” columns of the participation spectrum (see Box 3). The most advanced co-creation processes accord stakeholders joint decision-making authority with government and equal vetoing powers. Decision-making approaches include consensus (requiring unanimous agreement), majority rule (50%+1), qualified majority (two-thirds or three-fifths), and mixed rules that prioritize consensus with voting as a fallback.

Similar plans, voting, and voting approaches could be used to guide multistakeholder governance processes for DPI initiatives. It should be noted, however, that decision-making powers typically also require governments to formalize multistakeholder governance processes through legislation or a presidential discretionary authority. regulations can complement the good will, relationships, and trust that repeated engagements foster, and ensure accountability when they break down (see Box 6).

Box 6. Ukraine’s OGP Coordination Council: Governing digital public infrastructure through multistakeholder dialogue

Ukraine’s OGP Coordination Council has emerged as one of the more substantive examples of how a multistakeholder forum can build public trust in DPI, not least because it has maintained this function under conditions of active armed conflict. Ukraine joined the OGP in 2012 and has since completed six national action plans, with DPI-related commitments spanning open procurement, digital identity, and e-democracy tools forming a consistent thread throughout. The Coordination Council, Ukraine’s official OGP multistakeholder forum, has served as the institutional vehicle for convening government, civil society, the private sector, and international partners to co-design and oversee those commitments.

The most celebrated outcome of this governance model predates DPI as a concept but speaks directly to its logic. Prozorro, Ukraine’s open public procurement platform, was developed through a collaborative process in which civil society organizations, most notably Transparency International Ukraine, worked alongside government reformers and private sector actors to design a system that made contract data publicly accessible and auditable. The result was not merely a functional DPI but one whose legitimacy derived from the process through which it had been built. Prozorro.Sale, an extension of the same approach to state asset sales, went on to win an OGP award. Together, these initiatives demonstrated that DPI built with civil society, rather than for it, generates a qualitatively different kind of public trust, one grounded in demonstrated accountability rather than asserted intention.

The OGP Coordination Council’s approach to convening reflects a similar commitment to genuine rather than performative inclusion. An open competition was established to select the civil society co-chair of the forum, which as an approach signals credibility and independence in a way that appointment processes rarely do. The composition of the Council has also evolved: the 2023–2025 action plan cycle saw non-governmental members covering a considerably more diverse range of expertise than in previous cycles, with the co-creation process structured across online consultations, thematic meetings, and open written proposals. The degree of civil society influence on resulting commitments has been striking, in some action plan cycles, as many as 70% to 90% of commitments originated from civil society proposals, with government playing a responsive rather than directive role.

Ukraine’s most recent DPI commitment, the Diia.Engine platform for digital public services, reflects this collaborative ethos. Built on open-source infrastructure and developed with civil society input through co-creation and iterative testing, the platform is designed to be publicly auditable and reusable across government. Civil society organizations have been involved in localizing implementations, evaluating accessibility standards, and contributing to usability testing. The decision to embed a dedicated reform support team for DPI within the OGP process has also proved significant, providing the technical capacity to translate stakeholder dialogue into workable policy and embed it in legislation for long-term sustainability. That this work has continued through a full-scale war, with the OGP Coordination Council adapting to online formats and sustaining its reform agenda, speaks to the durability of the institutional relationships and trust built over years of structured engagement.

Key takeaways

  • An open competition for the civil society co-chair role, rather than appointment, meaningfully strengthens the credibility of the forum itself. Embedding specialist reform support teams within the OGP process provides the technical capacity needed to connect stakeholder dialogue to implementable policy. And the high proportion of commitments originating from civil society proposals suggests that genuine influence, not just participation, is what generates durable institutional trust.
  • As in Brazil’s Pix Forum (see Box 4), however, civil society participants have noted the need for clearer, more structured pathways between their contributions and decision-making to enhance their understanding of when and how their inputs in multistakeholder governance forums shape outcomes.

2.3. Adaptive capacity

The opportunity

The Development and Operations and Maintenance stages of the DPI initiative life cycle, when prototypes are tested and ongoing services refined, are critical moments to establish “adaptive capacity.” This accords with the Common Good Framework’s call for a rethinking of multistakeholder governance processes to support collective learning and build long-term capabilities.

For governments, this principle is about creating the conditions for continuous improvement and innovation rather than one-time implementation. DPI initiatives operate in complex, fast-changing environments where user needs evolve, technologies advance, and unforeseen challenges emerge. Multistakeholder processes that embrace experimentation, reflection, and adaptation can help initiatives remain responsive and effective over time.

Multistakeholder governance processes can enable DPI initiatives to test innovations, learn what works, and adapt based on evidence and
community feedback. However, the foundations for adaptive learning are laid through the trust built in the Conception and Scoping stage.

The challenge

Large-scale infrastructure projects typically reward predictability. Timelines, budgets, and deliverables are set in advance; adaptation is treated as deviation rather than as evidence of learning. DPI initiatives operate in a different kind of environment, one where user needs are not fully knowable at the outset, where unforeseen consequences are likely, and where the innovations that will ultimately be built atop digital infrastructure cannot be fully anticipated. Treating DPI development as a linear technical project is therefore a form of institutional risk, not a mitigation of it.

Creating genuine space for experimentation and course-correction requires governments and implementing institutions to be willing to acknowledge publicly when approaches are not working, a cultural shift in contexts where adaptation is often read as poor planning, and where political incentives favor the appearance of smooth delivery over honest reckoning with complexity. Adaptive capacity also depends on the quality of trust between governments and the communities they serve: stakeholders whose concerns have historically gone unheard are unlikely to raise problems early enough for adjustments to be made.

Building adaptive capacity therefore requires both structural changes to how DPI initiatives are governed: decentralizing decision-making, creating feedback loops, resourcing communities to participate in testing and iteration, and demonstrating commitment to acting on what is heard.

What works

Experience from adaptive governance initiatives in environmental management and international development demonstrates how governments can create structures that enable the community-driven testing of innovations, learning, and adaptations. These approaches offer valuable insights for DPI initiatives seeking to honor complexity by understanding user experiences and adapting systems based on evidence.

The literature shows that adaptive learning requires decentralized decision-making, with stakeholders close to the ground empowered to test innovations. An anti-corruption program in Ghana gave local stakeholders flexibility to invest in experimental interventions with expected high failure rates, a “portfolio approach” that enabled genuine learning. 23 Such approaches ensure innovations are tested in real-world conditions and by intended end-users (see Box 7). For DPI initiatives, this requires empowering regional stakeholders to work with communities to adapt the way DPI is rolled out and innovations tested in their contexts.

Box 7. Ethiopia’s Fayda: Adaptive governance before problems take root

Ethiopia’s national digital ID system, Fayda (Amharic for “value”), offers a distinctive account of adaptive capacity exercised at the design stage, before implementation had begun. Where adaptive governance is often understood as the ability to course-correct in response to problems as they emerge, Fayda illustrates a more demanding ambition: the deliberate use of evidence, stakeholder engagement, and cross-regional learning to prevent foreseeable problems from arising in the first place. Regional experience had made the stakes concrete. In a comparable context, the integration of biometric refugee registration with government identity systems, conducted without adequate community engagement, had left tens of thousands of people effectively stateless. Ethiopia’s National ID Program (NIDP) treated this not as background context but as a governance resource, using documented regional lessons to inform design choices before analogous path dependencies could take root.

Built on the MOSIP open-source digital identity platform and supported by a World Bank investment of US$350 million, Fayda was conceived as a universal system, providing a 12-digit biometric identifier to all legal residents of Ethiopia irrespective of status. The “one person, one identity” principle created the technical possibility of including refugees and asylum seekers in a national system. Realizing that possibility required a form of anticipatory governance: actively seeking out the knowledge needed to design inclusion well, before the architecture was fixed. NIDP engaged UNHCR and the Refugee and Returnee Service (RRS) well ahead of implementation, working together to map the specific needs and system requirements of refugee populations. This collaboration produced the PRIMES Interoperability Gateway, a technical bridge between UNHCR’s existing case management system and the national Fayda infrastructure, enabling real-time deduplication and verification while preserving clear data governance across both systems. A formal data-sharing agreement established the terms of data use, with an explicit commitment that refugee information would not be shared with countries of origin or third parties without consent.

Engagement with refugee and displaced communities also shaped implementation. Fayda enrollment was structured as an opt-in process, with refugees receiving comprehensive information about the system and its associated services before any data passed to the national program. Information campaigns through UNHCR’s channels reinforced this consent architecture. Weekly technical coordination meetings between NIDP, RRS, and UNHCR sustained the collaborative approach through rollout, providing a regular mechanism for surfacing and responding to emerging issues rather than allowing them to accumulate.

The outcomes reflect the program’s inclusive architecture. Enrolled refugees gained access to services previously unavailable to them, bank accounts, SIM cards, healthcare, school enrollment, and business registration. Ethiopia’s right to work directive became practically meaningful once the Fayda number was available to support permit applications, with over 1,200 refugee-owned small businesses already in operation as a result. With over 230,000 refugees verified at the time of writing and Zambia already seeking to learn from Ethiopia’s experience, the program’s adaptive learning function has extended beyond its borders.

Key takeaways

  • Build adaptive capacity into governance structures from the start. NIDP established collaborative mechanisms, the interoperability gateway, the data-sharing agreement, weekly coordination meetings, that enabled the program to anticipate and respond to challenges throughout design and implementation, rather than
    addressing them reactively.
  • Treat the experience of others as a governance resource. The harms that followed from inadequate engagement in comparable regional programs were well-documented. Fayda drew on those lessons deliberately, using cross-regional learning to inform design choices before costly problems could take root.
  • Embed consent and trust into the system’s architecture. The opt-in enrollment model and the data-sharing agreement were not procedural additions, they were the means by which the program earned legitimacy with refugee communities. Trust designed into a system from the outset is more durable than trust sought after rollout, and more amenable to ongoing adaptation as needs and circumstances evolve.

Building adaptive capacity also requires dedicated resources for activities that don’t produce immediate visible outputs. They may include convening stakeholders for reflection sessions, conducting studies to understand unintended impacts, piloting alternative approaches in specific contexts, and documenting lessons in accessible formats. Research on testing approaches to climate adaptation highlights mechanisms including community conversations, participatory workshops, experiential activities connecting communities and stakeholders with experts, and working groups linking community representatives with peers elsewhere. 24 These activities included capacity building to ensure participants developed shared technical understanding alongside experiential knowledge.

To ensure a flow of information from communities to DPI initiatives’ multistakeholder governing processes, research on adaptive governance emphasizes the necessity for “bridging organizations.” 25 A study of climate adaptations in Swedish and German municipalities also found that capable leaders experienced in working across government departments were better able to foster the ownership needed for continuous co-creation. 26 For DPI initiatives, governments should identify or establish bridging entities—whether existing digital agencies, multistakeholder forums, or dedicated coordination bodies—and leaders that can facilitate ongoing dialogue between more permanent multistakeholder governance arrangements, innovations’ implementers, and communities.

Effective adaptive learning requires regular structured reflection. Development programs use end-of-phase reviews, midterm assessments, and annual strategy sessions where teams analyze what’s changed, their effectiveness, and needed adjustments. 27 For DPI initiatives, similar rhythms could involve quarterly reviews with end users and regular “pause and reflect” sessions when testing new features.

Box 8. Policy options: Living labs for DPI innovation

Living labs (sometimes termed “testbeds”) are collaborative spaces where governments, private sector actors, civil society organizations, and citizens co-create, test, and refine innovations in real-world settings. Emerging from innovation studies in the 2000s, they represent “public-private-people partnerships” that bring diverse stakeholders together to address complex challenges through continuous experimentation. 28 The approach recognizes that valuable ideas can come from inside and outside organizations, and that user inputs improve development. Unlike controlled laboratory environments, living labs operate in actual contexts where citizens test prototypes during their everyday lives, providing feedback that shapes iterations. This grounds innovation in real needs and builds trust through demonstrated responsiveness.

For DPI initiatives, living labs could enable governments to test new identification methods, payment features, or data-sharing protocols with diverse user groups before full deployment. Successful labs typically involve citizens throughout the process, from problem framing to evaluation, and emphasize creative experimentation in time-bound projects.

A Dutch living lab addressing climate-induced water and soil challenges illustrates this approach. KLIMAP experimented with solutions in twenty-five pilot areas, working with water authorities, knowledge institutes, and local farmers to prove wide applicability. 29 They shared experiments and networks across labs, building evidence that ultimately influenced national policy. Crucially, they disseminated findings in accessible “Deltafacts” designed for diverse policy audiences.

Research shows living labs are “powerful enough to affect the bureaucratic core” when governmental sponsors signal commitment through clear accountability structures and “experimentation freedom.” 30 This convinces other powerful actors to invest in innovations and communities to trust them. Governments can support labs by providing dedicated funding, facilitating connections between labs to accelerate learning, and creating regulatory sandboxes where innovations can be tested without full compliance burdens initially.

For DPI, living labs could demonstrate scaling potential by testing innovations across different demographic groups, geographic contexts, or use cases. This can reveal what works where and why, whilst building the capacity and buy-in necessary for wider adoption.

Adaptive investment
The “portfolio” or “basket” approach sets programmatic ambition at the level of inputs without prescribing their nature in advance. It allows implementing teams to pursue whichever reform opportunities prove most tractable as political circumstances evolve. For DPI governance, where the technical, political and social conditions shaping adoption are rarely predictable at the outset, this approach offers a useful model: multistakeholder forums could define shared goals and a commitment to ongoing engagement without rigidly specifying the form that engagement must take, preserving the flexibility needed to respond to emerging challenges across the digitalization life cycle. This approach has also been used by the Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) program in Ghana and Strengthening Uganda’s Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR) program. 31

2.4. Maintaining trust

The opportunity

The Deployment and Operations and Maintenance stages of the digitalization life cycle are opportunities to strengthen trust between communities and governing stakeholders. This is critical for the adoption and continued use of new, DPI-supported innovations. Mechanisms that maintain trust ensure that users feel meaningfully included by proving that their feedback is acknowledged and addressed.

For governments, the importance of maintaining trust is about moving beyond initial buy-in to the sustained legitimacy that underpins continued use. Once operational, DPI begins affecting people’s daily lives in tangible ways, from how they access services to how their data is used. Trust can lead to virtuous cycles of greater cooperation, flows of vital information on operations and innovations, and participation in multistakeholder governance processes. The absence of trust can lead to low levels of adoption or even rejection.

However, the foundations for measuring and maintaining trust should be established during Strategy and Design, and mechanisms for both must evolve as initiatives mature and expand their functions.

The challenge

Traditional approaches to infrastructure often assume that once systems are operational, trust follows naturally from technical performance. DPI initiatives face a more demanding reality: they are constantly evolving, adding new features and use cases; they affect different population groups in different ways; and the legitimacy earned during co-creation processes is not permanent. Trust can erode quickly if communities feel that multistakeholder governance arrangements are tokenistic, or that they are being excluded from the initiative’s benefits.

Power imbalances create particular difficulties here. Government and private sector stakeholders typically have greater resources and technical expertise to monitor DPI performance and advocate for their interests. Without proactive efforts to address these disparities, DPI risks becoming captured by narrow interests over time, even where initial co-creation processes were genuinely inclusive.

Sustaining trust therefore requires ongoing investment in governance, not just in the system itself. Communities need continued opportunities to participate, raise concerns, and see those concerns acted upon, and governments need the mechanisms to identify and respond to emerging challenges before trust erodes.

Box 9. Policy options: Building trust through informal mechanisms

Informal planning groups

Trust has been foundational to multistakeholder governance arrangements since their inception. In complex initiatives, trust functions as an intangible resource that reduces collaboration costs and makes collective action possible. Simply put, trust makes social life predictable, creates a sense of community, and makes it easier for diverse stakeholders to work together. 32

Research shows trust emerges through transparent decision-making, consistent interactions among stakeholders, genuine power-sharing, and recognition of diverse knowledge systems. 33 However, building trust requires long-term investment with careful attention to historical contexts and power dynamics, timescales that rarely fit within traditional political or programmatic cycles.

An Alaskan climate adaptation initiative illustrates this in practice. 34 The informal Newtok Planning Group encompassed tribal, non-governmental, state, and federal stakeholders. Over seven years, it built trust through repeated formal and informal interactions. Community leaders identified locally appropriate adaptations while state authorities provided resources and technical expertise. Crucially, decisions were socialized among the wider community, ensuring broad ownership.

For DPI initiatives, this experience suggests that trust cannot be rushed but requires sustained commitment to inclusive processes, patience as relationships form across stakeholder groups, and acknowledgment that trust built through one positive interaction can be undermined by a single breach. Governments must recognize trust building as an investment in initiatives’ long-term viability, not a preliminary step to be completed quickly before “real work” begins.

What works

The extractive industries’ concept of a “social license to operate” (SLO) offers valuable insights for sustaining trust in DPI initiatives. An SLO represents the ongoing acceptance and approval that communities grant to initiatives affecting their lives. Unlike legislative licenses issued by governments, social licenses must be continuously earned through fair processes and demonstrated responsiveness to community concerns.

Research on SLOs often identifies three interconnected pathways to building and maintaining trust that have direct relevance for DPI governance. First, “procedural fairness” focuses on communities feeling that they meaningfully participate in forums where their voices are heard, feedback is delivered, and decisions are made. 35 This idea has roots in social psychology literature demonstrating how voice in decision-making supports cooperation and acceptance of new technologies. For DPI initiatives, this means ensuring community representatives have ongoing seats on multistakeholder governance bodies with genuine decision-making power, not just advisory roles.

Second, “distributional fairness” refers to the equitable distribution of benefits and risks, whether economic, social, or environmental. 36 Communities are more willing to accept disruptive transformational projects when they perceive fair outcomes. For DPI initiatives, this requires continuous assessment of how different population groups experience systems: who benefits from new services, who faces barriers to access, and whether innovations are inadvertently creating new forms of exclusion or exploitation.

Third, “confidence in government” concerns communities’ belief that DPI will be properly regulated and implementing stakeholders held accountable for poor practices. This pathway is particularly important for DPI initiatives where the government plays multiple roles as regulator, funder, and often implementer. Governments can build this confidence through visible regulatory backing, independent oversight bodies, and demonstrated willingness to intervene when problems arise.

The literature emphasizes that the relative importance of these trust-building pathways varies across contexts, and is shaped by sociopolitical histories and past experiences of government–community relations. This is why researchers describe obtaining an SLO as “both an art and a science,” requiring customization to local realities while following evidence-based principles. 37 Nonetheless, SLOs could underpin the legitimacy of DPI initiatives, securing the flow of information between communities and implementers, the adoption of innovations, and meaningful participation in multistakeholder governance processes.

Adapted from Zhang et al., “Understanding the Social Licence to Operate of Mining at the National Scale.”

Sustaining trust requires identifying and measuring it. Best practices suggest combining quantitative surveys with qualitative interviews and participant observations to gauge the health of a SLO. 38 For DPI initiatives, this might involve regular surveys of different user groups about their experiences and trust in multistakeholder processes, supplemented by in-depth interviews exploring why certain groups feel excluded or underserved. Such measurement helps governance bodies spot emerging challenges before trust erodes completely, enabling timely adaptations to multistakeholder processes or DPI features themselves.

Box 10. South Africa’s MyMzansi: Building and maintaining trust through inclusive DPI governance

South Africa’s MyMzansi initiative, a Cabinet-approved Digital Transformation Roadmap launched in 2024, represents one of the most deliberate attempts to embed public trust at the center of a national DPI program from the outset. Anchored in the Presidency and spanning four foundational pillars (digital identity, data exchange, payments, and digital services), MyMzansi is governed through a layered structure:

  • an Inter-Ministerial Committee providing political oversight
  • an Interdepartmental Working Group (IDWG) chaired by the Director-Generals of the Presidency, National Treasury, and the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies
  • a Digital Services Unit (DSU) responsible for day-to-day delivery

The complexity intentionally reflects the view, articulated clearly by those leading the initiative, that no single department could or should own a transformation of this scale. Importantly this is a work in progress. The government has established a license to operate, and there is now progress towards a broader social license to operate.

Trust building was not an afterthought but the explicit rationale for the multistakeholder approach. As one source close to the initiative explained: “The more stakeholders you have, the more people who buy into the vision, the more inclusive it is, the more likely people are to trust it and adopt it.” This logic is grounded in the realities of DPI adoption: because South Africa’s systems are consent-based rather than mandatorily imposed, public confidence in governance arrangements is a prerequisite for uptake. The risk of exclusion, and its unequal distribution, was front of mind. “It’s always going to be the people who are most vulnerable who are excluded,” one source noted, framing broad consultation not merely as procedural good practice but as a matter of distributional fairness.

The initiative deployed multiple mechanisms to operationalize this commitment:

  • The roadmap was developed around “Thandi,” a fictional South African citizen drawn from the National Development Plan, as a narrative anchor to keep service design centered on lived experience rather than institutional convenience.
  • An International Advisory Board was also established, drawing on experience from CDPI, India, Benin, Kazakhstan, and African partner countries, to embed international lessons while preserving local ownership.
  • UNDP was embedded directly into the legal and governance workstream, with two part-time staff contributing to consent forms, membership agreements, and safeguarding frameworks, a practical model for building civil society oversight into the infrastructure of governance rather than consulting it from the outside.
  • Co-design labs were convened to stress-test approaches with a broader ecosystem of participants, and industry associations, particularly in banking and telecoms, were engaged as partners through structured forums, with the country’s G20 chairmanship in 2025 providing additional leverage for civil society engagement and external support.

Challenges remain significant and are honestly acknowledged. Existing institutional mandates in South Africa’s public sector do not always
sit comfortably alongside the open-source, interoperable model that MyMzansi requires, and navigating these tensions has demanded sustained political cover and careful stakeholder management. Rather than seeking direct confrontation, the team commissioned an independent World Bank institutional review to generate evidence-based recommendations on long-term arrangements, using external credibility to create space for politically sensitive reform. Legal constraints around procurement also limit the forms that civil society partnership can take, a structural barrier that remains unresolved.

Key takeaways

Trust cannot be retrofitted once DPI is operational; it must be designed in from the beginning, including through the governance structures themselves. Embedding civil society partners directly into workstreams, rather than consulting them periodically, builds the kind of procedural fairness that sustains legitimacy over time. Centering design on a citizen persona grounds governance conversations in distributional outcomes. And commissioning independent external reviews to navigate entrenched institutional interests offers a replicable model for managing power dynamics without direct confrontation, buying the political space needed for reform to continue.

2.5. Transparency and accountability

The opportunity

The Deployment and E Operations and Maintenance stages of DPI initiatives’ life cycles, when systems are rolled out and ongoing services begin, present opportunities to ensure public value is maximized and commitments are honored. The Common Good Framework’s fifth principle suggests this can be achieved through transparent and accountable multistakeholder governance mechanisms that win and retain citizen trust in DPI initiatives.
For governments, this principle is about ensuring citizens can understand how decisions are made, how the information they provide DPI initiatives is used, and who is accountable when things go wrong. Transparency in decision-making processes, combined with meaningful accountability structures, helps to maintain the trust built during earlier stages of the DPI initiative life cycle.

Decentralized and co-created DPI initiatives can make accountability more complex, with multiple stakeholders involved in implementation and governance. However, when transparency and accountability are embedded in initiatives from the start, they can become sources of legitimacy rather than administrative burdens.

The challenge

Governments have the mandate and responsibility to ensure that citizen engagement is based on meaningful understanding. yet the complexity of DPI systems can make it difficult for citizens to understand how decisions affecting them are made and how information they provide, including their data, is used. When multiple stakeholders are involved in implementation and governance, lines of responsibility can become blurred, leaving citizens uncertain about who to approach when problems arise or when they seek redress.

Governments face challenges that require clear understanding and engagement in order to overcome them. Without clear accountability structures, vulnerable populations face the greatest risks of exclusion with no effective recourse. Technical barriers may prevent some citizens from accessing transparency mechanisms, while power imbalances between different stakeholders can result in accountability processes favoring those with greater resources or technical knowledge. There is also a risk that poorly designed accountability mechanisms become box-ticking exercises that fail to address genuine concerns or effect meaningful change.

Governments must balance the need for robust accountability with the flexibility required to support innovation and adaptation. Overly rigid regulations may stifle the experimentation and rapid iteration that allow DPI initiatives to respond to emerging needs and opportunities. At the same time, insufficient oversight can allow problematic practices to become embedded, eroding the trust necessary for widespread adoption and use of DPI services.

What works

Research on accountability in large-scale multi-stakeholder initiatives suggests that transparency must extend beyond technical systems to encompass governance processes themselves. The government’s role in establishing new Zealand’s Waihi Community Forum to guide a large mining project illustrates this approach. 39 The multistakeholder forum documented all contacts between the community, government, and company, publishing records for citizens to refer to and with which to hold all sides to account for promises made. This created a shared understanding of what had been agreed and by whom, making it clear where responsibility lay when issues arose.

Similar approaches have been adopted in OGP initiatives, where multistakeholder forums are required to publish minutes of their meetings, drafts of emerging plans, and explanations of how stakeholder input influenced final decisions. Brazil’s e-Democracia platform and Greece’s vouliwatch allow citizens to monitor and interact with those responsible for AP commitments, creating ongoing channels for transparency rather than one-off consultations. 40 The key lesson is that governance processes must be proactive, regularly communicating what is happening and why to wider publics.

Research on SLOs suggests that effective accountability requires combining multiple channels for raising concerns. 41 Although increasingly used, digital technologies must not create new barriers. DPI initiatives may leverage them to enable citizens to track how provided information and their data is used; Estonia’s e-health portal is an often-cited example. But research strongly suggests that not all citizens will have the digital literacy to benefit. 42 Governments should therefore ensure accountability mechanisms also include analog options, such as telephone hotlines and in-person assistance.

The literature emphasizes that accountability mechanisms must be capable of effecting change, not merely recording complaints. This requires clear protocols for how issues are investigated, who is responsible for addressing them, and timelines for responses and resolutions. Citizens should be informed about the status of their complaints and the outcomes of investigations, thereby “closing the loop” even when their desired resolution cannot be achieved (see Box 11). research on adaptive governance suggests that regular public reporting on patterns in complaints and how they have led to changes helps build confidence that accountability mechanisms have teeth. 43

Governments can also play roles to ensure multistakeholder processes act once problems are identified. The Waihi Community Forum was given the power to select outsiders to serve on an Independent review Panel designed to act as an “ombudsman” for contentious matters, thereby increasing trust in governance. 44 Such independent bodies can provide impartial assessments when disputes arise between stakeholders over how to respond to raised issues or when they are ignoring them. By establishing these mechanisms early and ensuring they have real authority, governments signal their commitment to accountability.

DPI initiatives operate in fast-changing technological and social contexts, meaning that accountability frameworks and regulations must themselves be adaptive. Multistakeholder governance bodies can play important roles in reviewing and recommending updates to regulations, drawing on their diverse perspectives and frontline knowledge of how systems are functioning in practice. Governments, as the ultimate regulatory authorities, can then choose to take their advice onboard.

Box 11. Policy options: Closing the loop

Closing the loop refers to the practice of informing participants about how their inputs were used and what outcomes resulted from their engagement. Research shows this is essential for maintaining trust and preventing participation from feeling extractive: when citizens take time to provide feedback or raise concerns, they expect evidence that their contributions were heard and considered. Without this follow-up, participation fatigue sets in and engagement declines over time. 45 The following approaches offer governments practical instruments for fulfilling this obligation systematically.

Tracked input registers and public response statements require governments to publish a formal record of submissions or grievances received alongside an explanation of what was accepted, modified, or declined and why. Brazil’s e-Democracia platform and Greece’s Vouliwatch allow citizens to monitor commitment holders and submit inputs directly, creating ongoing channels for transparency rather than one-off consultations. 46 DPI governance charters can incorporate equivalent requirements, drawing on the OGP’s co-creation standards as a model.

Citizen-facing data access logs build transparency directly into the technical architecture of DPI systems, enabling users to verify on an ongoing basis how their data is being handled. Estonia’s national health portal allows every citizen to see a named log of every healthcare professional who has accessed their record and when, making accountability continuous and self-service rather than dependent on institutional assurances.

Independent review panels with community nomination rights give communities a meaningful role in appointing the bodies that adjudicate contested decisions. New Zealand’s Waihi Community Forum held the authority to nominate outsiders to an Independent Review Panel acting as an ombudsman for contentious matters, an arrangement that increased confidence in outcomes precisely because communities could not be excluded from the process. 47

Complaint pattern reporting and public dashboards require periodic publication of grievance data disaggregated by issue type, location, and demographic group, making the pattern of concerns visible not only to the individual complainant but to civil society, media, and parliamentarians. The CAO Grievance Mechanism Toolkit’s seven performance parameters provide a ready-made disclosure framework that DPI governance arrangements can adopt directly.

Periodic loop-closing reviews embed closing the loop as a recurring governance function by scheduling structured moments, annually or bi-annually, at which the multistakeholder forum collectively reviews inputs and grievances received, confirms what has changed in response, and publishes the outcomes. The PDIA Toolkit’s iteration check-in tools offer a practical framework for structuring these sessions.

Importantly, closing the loop is not something that happens automatically. It requires intent, effort and resources to be successful.

Box 12. Estonia’s health Portal: data transparency as an accountability mechanism

When Estonia launched its national health information system in 2008, the government faced a challenge that will be familiar to many DPI implementers: how to persuade citizens to entrust their most sensitive personal data to a centralized digital system administered by the state. The approach it took built transparency into the architecture itself, giving citizens the means to verify, on an ongoing basis, how their data was being governed.
Through the patient portal (originally digilugu. ee, replaced by terviseportaal.ee in 2023) every citizen can use their national digital identity to log in and see their complete health record alongside a named log of every healthcare professional who has accessed it and when. Citizens can also selectively restrict access to their records, controlling data sharing at the level of individual providers. This is the closing-the-loop principle applied to data governance: the system makes visible, in real time, how information is handled, rather than asking citizens to rely on institutional assurances.

The governance foundations were established before the technical system launched. The Estonian e-Health Foundation, created in 2005 to coordinate implementation, was founded by a deliberate coalition of institutional stakeholders that included the Ministry of Social Affairs, the country’s three largest hospitals, the Estonian Society of Family Doctors, the Estonian Hospitals Union, and the Association of Ambulance Doctors. Legislative clarity accompanied this: the Health Services Organisation Act and the National Health Information System Regulation established the rules governing data access, with all classification systems publicly published.

Participation by healthcare providers that submit data to the system was made mandatory, which ensured that the record citizens see was comprehensive from the outset. The transparency mechanism has demonstrable teeth. In 2020, Estonia’s Data Protection Inspectorate fined a police officer for accessing his fiancée’s health records and a healthcare worker for looking up the circumstances of an ambulance call on a neighbor’s behalf.48 Both cases were made public, reinforcing a principle that shapes how citizens relate to the system: the access log exists, it is checked, and violations carry consequences. Enforcement of this kind is what distinguishes a genuine accountability mechanism from nominal one, and it is central to how the transparency design sustained public trust across fifteen-plus years of operation.

The system has been continuously refined through structured stakeholder engagement. Development of the 2023 portal involved general practitioners, dentists, the Estonian Society for Laboratory Medicine, the Health Board, the Estonian Blind Union, and the Estonian Chamber of Disabled People.49 A public feedback campaign during the development phase drew nearly 200 participants, and the documented adjustments made in response included the simplification of medical terminology, on the basis that records should be legible to the people they concern, not only to clinicians. The new portal reached 900,000 logins per month within its first six months, compared with an average of 640,000 for its predecessor.

The system’s architects have consistently acknowledged the limits of digital access as a universal mechanism. Research comparing Estonia, Denmark, and Australia found that differences in citizen health literacy and digital literacy remained an area of ongoing attention, with opt-in and opt-out design choices affecting who the system practically served. 48 Estonia’s response has been iterative rather than declaratory: designing for simpler language, investing in digital identity infrastructure that works across multiple device types, and maintaining analogue pathways where needed.

Key takeaways

  • Embedding a transparency mechanism into the technical architecture of DPI, rather than relying on policy statements, gives citizens ongoing, verifiable evidence of how their data is governed.
  • Transparency mechanisms require enforcement to function as genuine accountability mechanisms. Mechanisms without enforcement capacity signal accountability; mechanisms with enforcement capacity create it.
  • Iterative engagement with diverse stakeholder groups throughout the system life cycle produces systems that are legible and usable across the populations they are designed to serve.

  1. Aaditeshwar Seth, “Missing Publics in Digital Public Goods: The Need to Build Technologies for Communities,” October 2022.
  2. Aaditeshwar Seth, “Missing Publics in Digital Public Goods: The Need to Build Technologies for Communities,” October 2022; Aaditeshwar Seth et al., “A Governance Framework for Digital Public Infrastructure: Learning from the Indian Experience,” Think20, July 2023.
  3. Victor Kabata, “An Assessment of the Legal and Regulatory Framework Supporting the Implementation of the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS) in Kenya,” Data and Policy 6 (2024).
  4. David Eaves et al., “Unpacking Digital ID Systems’ Early Policy Process,” Technology and Regulation (2024): 330–52.
  5. G20, “G20 Digital Economy Ministers Meeting Outcome Document and Chair Summary,” August 2023.
  6. World Bank, Digital Public Infrastructure and Development: A World Bank Group Approach (2025).
  7. UNDP and UN ODET, The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework: A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies (2024).
  8. UNDP and UN ODET, The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework: A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies (2024).
  9. DIAL et al., DPI Roadmap Playbook (2026).
  10. Co-Develop and Caribou, Multistakeholder Governance for DPI: A Practitioner’s Guide for Building Trust and Unlocking Adoption (2026).
  11. UNDP and UN ODET, The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework: A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies (2024).
  12. M. Mazzucato et al., “Digital Public Infrastructure and Public Value: What Is ‘Public’ about DPI?,” Working Paper Series, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, 2024.
  13. International Association for Public Participation, “IAP2 Spectrum of Participation, 2024.”
  14. Matt Andrews et al., “Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA),” World Development 51 (2013): 234–44.
  15. Matt Andrews, “Explaining Positive Deviance in Public Sector Reforms in Development,” World Development 74 (October 2015): 197–208.
  16. USAID, “What Difference Does CLA Make to Development? Key Findings from a Literature Review,” United States Agency for International Development, 2023.
  17. A. Lawson et al., Interim Evaluation of the CABRI Building PFM Capabilities Programme-Applying PDIA Techniques to PFM Problems in African Countries Draft Report (Gates Foundation, 2020).
  18. OGP, “ OGP Participation and Co-Creation Standards,” November 2021.
  19. Deliberative Polling® is a trademark of James S. Fishkin.
  20. More guidance can be found in the OGP Handbook section on Multistakeholder Forums.
  21. 21 national action plans are also explicitly outlined in DIAL et al., DPI Roadmap Playbook (2026).
  22. OGP, Designing and Managing an OGP Multi-Stakeholder Forum: A Practical Handbook with Guidance and Ideas (2019).
  23. Ed Laws and Heather Marquette, Thinking and Working Politically: Reviewing the Evidence on the Integration of Politics into Development Practice over the Past Decade (TWP Community of Practice, 2018).
  24. Semra A. Aytur et al., “Aligning Climate Change Adaptation Planning with Adaptive Governance: Lessons from Exeter, NH,” Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education 155, no. 1 (2015).
  25. Lisa Sharma-Wallace et al., “ Adaptive Governance Good Practice: Show Me the Evidence!,” Journal of Environmental Management 222 (September 2018): 174–84.
  26. Christine Wamsler, “Stakeholder Involvement in Strategic Adaptation Planning: Transdisciplinarity and Co-Production at Stake?,” Environmental Science & Policy 75 (September 2017): 148–57.
  27. Pedro Prieto Martin et al., Adaptive Management in SDC: Challenges and Opportunities (Institute of Development Studies and Partner Organisations, 2020).
  28. Joëlle Mastelic, “Stakeholders’ Engagement in the Co-Design of Energy Conservation Interventions: The Case of the Energy Living Lab” (Université de Lausanne, 2019), https://arodes.hes-so.ch/record/4081.
  29. ENoLL, Proceedings of the OpenLivingLab Days Conference 2024: “Living Labs Frontiers: Driving Systemic Change through Soci(et)al Engagement, for Real Impact (2024).
  30. J. J. Willems et al., “Policy Integration in Urban Living Labs: Delivering Multi-Functional Blue-Green Infrastructure in Antwerp, Dordrecht, and Gothenburg,” Environmental Policy and Governance 33, no. 3 (2023): 258–71.
  31. S. Callaghan and G. Plank, LASER Synthesis Paper: Learning, Monitoring and Evaluating: Achieving and Measuring Change in Adaptive Programmes (DFID, 2017).
  32. Per Olsson et al., “Adaptive Comanagement for Building Resilience in Social–Ecological Systems,” Environmental Management 34, no. 1 (2004): 75–90; Carl Folke et al., “Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 30, no. Volume 30, 2005 (2005): 441–73.
  33. R. A. Turner et al., “Trust, Confidence, and Equity Affect the Legitimacy of Natural Resource Governance,” Ecology and Society 21, no. 3 (2016).
  34. Robin Bronen and F. Stuart Chapin III, “Adaptive Governance and Institutional Strategies for Climate-Induced Community Relocations in Alaska,” PNAS 110, no. 23 (2013): 9320–25.
  35. Kieren Moffat and Airong Zhang, “The Paths to Social Licence to Operate: An Integrative Model Explaining Community Acceptance of Mining,” Resources Policy 39 (March 2014): 61–70.
  36. Airong Zhang et al., “Understanding the Social Licence to Operate of Mining at the National Scale: A Comparative Study of Australia, China and Chile,” Journal of Cleaner Production 108 (December 2015): 1063–72.
  37. Justine Lacey et al., “The Art and Science of Community Relations: Procedural Fairness at Newmont’s Waihi Gold Operations, New Zealand,” Resources Policy 52 (June 2017): 245–54.
  38. Alberto Diantini et al., “Is This a Real Choice? Critical Exploration of the Social License to Operate in the Oil Extraction Context of the Ecuadorian Amazon,” Sustainability 12, no. 20 (2020): 8416.
  39. Justine Lacey et al., “The Art and Science of Community Relations: Procedural Fairness at Newmont’s Waihi Gold Operations, New Zealand,” Resources Policy 52 (June 2017): 245–54.
  40. OECD, Open Government for Stronger Democracies: A Global Assessment (2023).
  41. Alberto Diantini et al., “Is This a Real Choice? Critical Exploration of the Social License to Operate in the Oil Extraction Context of the Ecuadorian Amazon,” Sustainability 12, no. 20 (2020): 8416.
  42. OECD, Open Government for Stronger Democracies: A Global Assessment (2023).
  43. Lisa Sharma-Wallace et al., “Adaptive Governance Good Practice: Show Me the Evidence!,” Journal of Environmental Management 222 (September 2018): 174–84.
  44. Justine Lacey et al., “The Art and Science of Community Relations: Procedural Fairness at Newmont’s Waihi Gold Operations, New Zealand,” Resources Policy 52 (June 2017): 245–54.
  45. Anupriya Khan and Satish Krishnan, “Citizen Engagement in Co-Creation of e-Government Services: A Process Theory View from a Meta-Synthesis Approach,” Internet Research 31, no. 4 (2021): 1318–75.
  46. OECD, Open Government for Stronger Democracies: A Global Assessment (2023).
  47. Justine Lacey et al., “The Art and Science of Community Relations: Procedural Fairness at Newmont’s Waihi Gold Operations, New Zealand,” Resources Policy 52 (June 2017): 245–54.
  48. SA Mathieson, “How Estonia Made Digital ID Work through Choice, Transparency and Trust,” Public Technology.Net, November 13, 2025.

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